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This comment is based upon an address by Professor Van Aistyne
to the Annual Conference of the United States Court ofAppealsfor the
District of Columbia Circuit, delivered on May 17, 1984, at Williams-
burg, Virginia.
Although the first amendment belongs to all the states, it especially
belongs to Virginia.' The most notable antecedent debates occurred
here. The seminal contributions by James Madison and Thomas Jef-
ferson originated here. The strongest resolves to protect religious lib-
erty from political interference were memorialized here. My
immediate purpose is to comment on one particular case decided last
term in the Supreme Court, Lynch v. Donnelly,2 which sustained a mu-
nicipality's nativity display against a constitutional challenge. I mean
* Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. The Supreme Court wrote in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947):
No one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies can rightly be given entire
credit for having aroused the sentiment that culminated in the Bill of Rights' provisions
embracing religious liberty. But Virginia, where the established church had achieved a
dominant influence in political affairs and where many excesses attracted wide public
attention, provided a great stimulus and able leadership for the movement. The people
there, as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or
otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious
individual or group.
See also JEFFERSON, An Acfor Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 300-03 (A. Bergh ed. 1905); J. MADISON, Memorial and.Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298-306 (1973). See generaly T.
BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 1776-1787 (1977); H. ECKENRODE,
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA (1910); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 366-97 (1964) (one-vol. rev. of A. STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950)).
2. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The case furthers the trend represented in the preceding term by
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), a decision upholding the conduct in a state legislature
of regular sectarian prayer, led by ministers paid from tax revenues.
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briefly to examine the case by the light of an understanding of the first
amendment that Jefferson and Madison may have shared. My broader
purpose is to suggest the extent to which Lynch v. Donnely may serve
as a synecdoche of a larger drift that now appears to be winning accept-
ance in the Supreme Court.
This trend can be summed up as a movement from one national
epigram to another; it is the movement from "E Pluribus Unum" to "In
God We Trust," from the ideal expressed by our original Latin
motto-one nation out of highly diverse but equally welcome states
and people-to an increasingly pressing enthusiasm in which govern-
ment re-establishes itself under distinctly religious auspices. Lynch v.
Donnelly is the clearest expression to date that acts affiliating govern-
ment and religion may be deemed consistent with the first amendment,
at least if accomplished gradually, that is, incrementally. A constitu-
tional neologism has nearly displaced the much different figure of
speech, that of a "wall of separation" between church and state, which
Thomas Jefferson once used in commemorating the ratification of the
first amendment.3 The neologism is that insofar as most persons are
religious, it is altogether natural that government should itself reflect
that fact in its own practices. Thus, according to this neologism, it is
not helpful to regard the first amendment as having emplaced a wall
separating the practices of religion from the practices of government,
for it is not walls, but bridges, that the first amendment contemplates.
Even the absorption of a dominant religion within government itself
may be deemed altogether unexceptionable-as though it were but a
part of natural history. It is thus symbiosis, not separation, that the first
amendment may be interpreted to accommodate. At least I cannot un-
derstand Lynch v. Donnelly otherwise, although I think it very far re-
3. Jefferson wrote of a "wall of separation" in replying to an address from a committee of
the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
T. JEFFERSON, Letter of Jan. 1, 1802, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A.
Bergh ed. 1905). In Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359, Chief Justice Burger writes of Jefferson's "walr":
The concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from
views of Thomas Jefferson. The metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establish-
ment Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching it. But the meta-
phor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship
that in fact exists between church and state.
He goes on to say that far from requiring "complete separation of church and state," the Consti-
tution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any." Id
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moved from the interpretation of the first amendment originally agreed
upon by all nine Justices of the Supreme Court when the issue was first
comprehensively addressed, in Everson v. Board of Education,4 nearly
forty years ago.
I.
Although there is of course very substantial controversy over the
"right" meaning of the religion clauses of the first amendment, 5 there
is nonetheless considerable agreement that they originally met with
broad support from at least three distinct sources. The disagreement
has been not so much whether there were not at least these three sepa-
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. As a sampler of academic books and articles on the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment, the following may be helpful: R. CoRD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 5, 15 (1982)
(first amendment was not intended to preclude federal aid to religion "on a nondiscrimination
basis"); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965) (discussing federalism and
the first amendment); W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 12-13 (1964) (sup-
porting a theory of "full neutrality . .. requiring the government to be neutral not only between
sects but also between believers and nonbelievers"); P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 45-51 (1964) (arguing that historical sources are inconclusive and that "it is more useful [in
construing the religion clauses] to look at what actual results have been reached in [their] applica-
tion"); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962) (also supporting the neutrality theory;
"democratic society cannot survive if these elements of the rule of law are rejected"); M. MALBIN,
RELIGION AND POLITICS 1-17 (American Enterprise Institute Studies in Legal Policy, 1978) (argu-
ing that Madison compromised with those in the first Congress who believed that Congress should
be free to prefer religion over irreligion); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (rev. ed.
1967) (a compendious history); THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (D. Oaks, ed. 1963)
(collecting articles); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITr. L. REV. 673, 675 (1980) (arguing that "the establishment clause should forbid only
government action whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely to impair religious free-
dom"); Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Go vernmental Interference with Religious Organiza-
tions, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 349 (1984) (arguing that the establishment clause "does not
disassociate religion from government" but acts as "a limitation on any mutual dependence");
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I The Religious
Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1384-85 (1967) (proposing "a rather simple scheme of
the elementary factors weighed by the court in evaluating religious liberty claims"); Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Nonestablishment
Princile, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1968) (continuing Part I); Moore, The Supreme Court and the
Relationship Between the "Etablishment' and 'Free Exercise, Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 142 (1963)
(supporting a neutrality theory); Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma
ofthe First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561 (1980) (examining conflict between the two religion
clauses); Schwarz, No Imposition ofReligion The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692,
693 (1968) (arguing that the establishment clause "prohibit[s] only aid which has as its motive or
substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or practice"); Van Alstyne, Constitutional Sepa-
ration ofChurch and State: The Questfor a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 865 (1963);
Note, Rebuilding the Wall- The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretation ofthe Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1463 (1981) (proposing "a standard that erects an impregnable
wall between church and state"); Note, Towarda Constitutional Defnition o/Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1056, 1056 (1978) (proposing a "narrower" definition of religion under the establishment
clause than under the free exercise clause).
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rate sets of political interest, each of which could be well served by the
proposed clauses; it was rather whether one or another was so domi-
nant that acts of government consistent with that set of interests, albeit
not necessarily equally consistent with one of the other sets of interests,
should be deemed consistent with the clauses as ratified. Up to a point,
however, the Supreme Court treated them as converging on a single
legal principle and thus felt no compulsion to treat those interests as
rivals among which it need choose. Rather, the matter was seen as
yielding a single legal principle, quite robust by itself, and substantially
consistent with all three sets.
These diverse inputs were the concerns of voluntarism, separatism,
and federalism. The first, voluntarism, was derived largely from the
moderate spirit of religious toleration associated with the Quaker tradi-
tion of Pennsylvania. 6 The second, separatism, was derived principally
from the successful efforts of Madison and Jefferson in Virginia to dis-
entangle the affairs of government from religious establishments, espe-
cially in respect to taxes and levies for religious assistance. 7 The third,
federalism, was derived from the preferences of other states that-in
contrast with Virginia-maintained particular religious establishments,
which they were concerned to keep free from the interference of the
national government.8 It was quite consistent with all three concerns
that they would converge on a single proposition: Congress should be
disabled from legislating on religion.9 The final form of agreement in-
6. Maryland, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania have been grouped together as "the most
successful colonial experiments in religious freedom which the transformers of colonies into states
and the framers of our American Constitution had before them." 1 A. STOKCES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 364 (1950). Of these, Penn's colony was "the most consistent." Id
Penn's influential Frame of Government (1682) provided that all persons otherwise qualified who
"possess faith in Jesus Christ" were eligible to serve in legislative and executive capacities. 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1526 (B. Poore ed. 1877). This toleration of all Protestant sects and of Ca-
tholicism was remarkable in its day, though, as Stokes writes, Penn was "no modem secularist." 1
A. STOKES, supra, at 207; c. P. KAUPER, supra note 5, at 48 (crediting Roger Williams and other
religious leaders who contributed to "the American experiment in religious liberty").
7. See supra note I.
8. See M. HowE, supra note 5, at 1-31. At the time that the first amendment was adopted,
five states had established churches-Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maryland,
and South Carolina. I A. STOKES, supra note 6, at 559; see also Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separa-
ion: The Constitutional Dilemma ofthe First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 562-63 (1980).
Madison attempted to write a guarantee of religious liberty for all citizens into the Bill of
Rights, which would have overridden those states that had not yet guaranteed their citizens such
rights. He failed. See I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, at
273 (1950). Not until 1833 did all states abandon established religion. See L. PFEFFER, supra note
5, at 126.
9. "To leave the thorny matter of religion to each state, and at the same time to clearly
guarantee no jurisdiction in the matter by the national government, was the expedient compro-
mise." Esbeck, supra note 5, at 364; see also infra text accompanying note 18.
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troduces the first amendment itself: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
Accepted at face value, the concerns of voluntarism, separatism,
and federalism were not at odds with one another. They framed no
tension; rather, they mutually reinforced a single proposition: Ques-
tions of religious choice were not to be the business of the national
government. 10 Article VI of the Constitution had already provided that
"no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under the United States,""l a provision meant to make it
quite clear that "unbelievers or Mohammedans" were not excludable.' 2
The motto of the new nation, proposed in a Continental Congress com-
mittee report by Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson, and adopted for use
in the Great Seal of the United States in 1782, was "E Pluribus
Unum."' 3 The original legend on new coins, first on continental dol-
lars, then on the fugio cent minted in Philadelphia, in 1787, was "Mind
Your Business."' 4 The inscription on the obverse side of the Great Seal
was "Novus Ordo Seclorum," a New Order of the Ages. 15 The secular
separation assured each individual that none need feel alien to this
government, whatever his own religion or personal philosophy, for it
was to be a temporal government not commingled with a clergy, a the-
ism, or a church. At the same time, this wall of separation-in Jeffer-
son's terminology' 6-assured the several states that they would be
immune from attempts by the national government to influence or limit
their own religious establishments in any respect.
The resolve to forbid this national government from adopting a
religion or reserving its offices for only the religious carried over to the
field of international affairs. Whatever the disposition of other nations,
each might expect a relationship of amity with the United States, which
10. SeeM. HowE, supra note 5, at 17-23. But cf. R. CORD, supra note 5 (concluding that the
first amendment does not absolutely bar government from religious involvement). See generally
P. KURLAND, supra note 5; L. PFEFFER, supra note 5.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
12. See I A. STOKES, sufpra note 6, at 603; see also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION § 1871 (Boston 1833) (referring to the article VI guarantee that "the Catholic and the
Protestant, the Calvinist and the Armenian, the infidel and the Jew, may sit down at the common
table of the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of worship").
13. See G. HUNT, THE HISTORY OF THE SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES 7, 41 (1909); A.
STOKES, supra note 6, at 467-68.
14. THE COMPREHENSIVE CATALOGUE AND ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES COINS 53,
201 (J. Rose & H. Hazelcorn eds. 1976).
15. G. HUNT, supra note 13, at 41.
16. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 3.
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itself incorporated no religious predisposition against any nation. This
observation is illustrated in article XI of our 1797 treaty with Tripoli:
As the government of the United States of America is not in any
sense founded on the Christian religion-as it has in itself no charac-
ter of emnity [sic] against the laws, religion, or tranquillity of Mus-
selmen-and as the said states never have entered into any war or act
of hostility against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the par-
ties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce
an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.' 7
So strongly was the principle respected by some that they were to
risk quite substantial political opprobrium in its behalf, even where the
risk may have seemed unnecessary to undertake. Thus, when Congress
resolved to request merely precatory presidential statements of annual
thanksgiving, themselves seemingly harmless and altogether uncon-
troversial gestures unlikely to offend anyone, Washington and Adams
easily acquiesced-but Jefferson could not. The practice was doubtless
well intentioned, he admitted, but the principle was careless and un-
sound. "I do not think myself authorized to comply," Jefferson wrote,
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the
Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only from the pro-
vision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment or free
exercise of religion, but from that also which reserves to the States
the powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly, no power
to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious
discipline, has been delegated to the General Government. . . .I do
not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magis-
trate to direct its exercises, its discipline, or its doctrines; nor of the
religious societies, that the General Government should be invested
with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or matter among
them....
I am aware that the practice of my predecessors may be quoted.
But I have ever believed, that the example of State executives led to
the assumption of that authority by the General Government, with-
out due examination, which would have discovered that what might
be a right in a State government, was a violation of that right when
assumed by another. Be this as it may, every one must act according
to the dictates of his own reason, and mine tells me that civil powers
alone have been given to the President of the United States, and no
authority to direct the religious exercises of his constituents.' 8
17. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nov. 4, 1796-Jan. 3, 1797, United States-Tripoli, art. XI,
8 Stat. 154, 155, T.S. No. 358. But see I STOKES, supra note 6, at 497-98 (claiming that the lan-
guage "the government of the United States is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion
." was "virtual[ly] repudiat[ed]" by its omission less than a decade later from the extended
Tripoli Treaty).
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428-30 (A. Bergh ed. 1905). For further discussion on Jefferson's
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Madison, as president, did not adhere to Jefferson's example but,
even after he had discounted such ceremonial utterances for fasts and
festivals as "merely recommendatory" and "absolutely indiscriminate,"
he acknowledged that in fact they constituted a "deviation from the
strict principle" he shared with Jefferson.1 9 Similarly, Madison ac-
knowledged that he had been quite mistaken in approving-as a mem-
ber of the House, in 1789-bills for the payment of, congressional
chaplains.20 "Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of
Congress," he asked,
consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principles of reli-
gious freedom? ... In strictness the answer on both points must be
in the negative. The Constitution of the U.S. forbids everything like
an establishment of a national religion. The law appointing Chap-
lains establishes a religious worship for the national representatives,
to be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by a majority of
them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes. . . . If Reli-
gion consists in voluntary acts of individuals, singly, or voluntarily
associated, and [if] it be proper that public functionaries, as well as
their Constituents should discharge their religious duties, let them
like their Constituents, do so at their own expense. 21
The feature of tax subsidy was especially offensive to Madison-unsur-
prisingly, since it was that very practice that he and Jefferson had suc-
cessfully opposed in Virginia. There, Madison had written that not
even "three pence" should be coerced of any person, through taxes, for
the propagation of religious views with which he disagreed. 22 The
view of the proper relationship between government and religion see L. LEvY, JEFFERSON AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963).
19. 1 A. STOKES, supra note 6, at 491.
20. Id at 456. Robert Cord has suggested that these reflections by Madison should be dis-
missed for the same reason, he says, that it would be "absurd" for any serious analyst or historian
to give the slightest credence to equivalent statements by Mr. Nixon respecting the wrongness or
unconstitutionality of surreptitious tape recordings in which he participated when he was presi-
dent. R. CORD, supra note 5, at 36. But even supposing one accepted his comparison of James
Madison with Richard Nixon, his idea of what the serious analyst or historian should do seems
odd. If, indeed, Mr. Nixon were even now to suggest that he may have been quite wrong, and that
he now does regard what he did as president as having been inconsistent with the fourth amend-
ment, is it the case that every serious analyst or historian should: (a) dismiss such a statement as
wholly unworthy of credence, and (b) record Mr. Nixon as necessarily having held the view that
what he did as president was wholly consistent with the fourth amendment? Why would the
serious analyst or historian do so?
21. Madison, Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago, HARPER'S MAG. 489, 493 (1914),
quoted in 1 A. STOKES, supra note 6, at 346-47; c. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336-37
(1983) ("Remuneration [of a state legislature's chaplaincy] is grounded in historic practice initi-
ated ... by the same Congress that adopted the Establishment Clause. ... ).
22. J. MADISON, supra note 1, at 300. The particular application of the establishment clause
as a use restriction on congressional appropriations drawn from taxes is a source of taxpayer
standing that has thus far been unique to the first amendment. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
101-06 (1968) (two-part test: taxpayer has standing only where he alleges (a) exercise of congres-
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point, reflecting Madison's broader, Virginian, perspective went be-
yond the abuse of the tax power as such. Thus, although no taxes were
involved, and although the matter was obviously not one he needed to
interfere with, Madison, as president, vetoed a grant of land made by
Congress for what Congress thought a benign use by a Baptist church
[because the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the United
States for the use of said Baptist Church, comprises a principle and
precedent, for the appropriation of funds of the United States, for the
use and support of religious societies; contrary to the article of the
Constitution which declares that Congress shall make no law respect-
ing a religious establishment.23
The separation principle, moreover, operated in both directions; it
was meant to keep religion from entangling the state as well as to keep
the churches free from the state influence that would have been the
inevitable concomitant of state financial support. The Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, of 1785, inveighed against
the risk that "the Civil Magistrate. . . may employ Religion as an en-
gine of Civil policy," and equally against the infusion of any particular
religion within government "because it will have a like tendency to
banish our Citizens," i.e., to make them aliens to their own govern-
ment.2 4 Competition among religions for position within government
must be avoided so that none need fear any other, as each might other-
wise seek its own establishment through government or within
sional taxing and spending power and (b) violation of a "specific constitutional limitation" upon
that power). Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476-82 (1982) (first prong of Flast test not satisfied where complaint
was based on agency, not congressional, action and congressional authorization of agency action
was not derived from taxing and spending power); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923) (taxpayer, failing to show "direct injury," denied standing to challenge constitutionality of
federal statute).
For examples of how the free exercise clause may appropriately permit exemption from gov-
ernment regulation, as distinct from either requiring or permitting a tax subsidy for a religious
practice, see discussion and cases infra notes 30, 31; see also Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 690-93 (1980) (disapproving
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), insofar as "compulsorily raised tax funds" paid to plain-
tiff to enable her to practice her religion were improper as a forbidden levy on others). In a
passage reminiscent of Madison, see supra text accompanying note 21, Choper writes:
IT]he Establishment Clause should be held to forbid the government's paying chaplains
to minister to the religious needs of prisoners and miltary personnel. It may be that,
under a Free Exercise Clause balancing test, the state could not exclude chaplains who
volunteer for these purposes. But the Establishment Clause makes it the financial re-
sponsibility of the church and not the state to attend to its members' religious needs.
Choper, supra, at 693-94.
23. President's Message of Feb. 28, 1811, to the House of Representatives, Returning a Bill,
22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1098 (1811).
24. J. MADISON, supra note 1, at 301-02.
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government.25
Voluntarism, then, was the principle of personal choice. Separa-
tism was the principle of non-entanglement. Federalism was the prin-
ciple of pure state autonomy, immune from national power, respecting
policies that affect religion. Laws favoring religious establishments,
like laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion, were thus altogether
disallowed. The contributing streams of the first amendment were not,
in this view, jostling and competitive. Rather, they converged on a sin-
gle proposition thought eminently suitable for the national govern-
ment. Citizens from all states, regardless of each state's own internal
practices, would be assured of being able to meet on common secular
ground to conduct the civil business of a purely civil government. The
authority of that government was of enumerated civil powers that in-
corporated none of a religious provenance or cast, and was constrained
from directing or otherwise influencing the voluntarism of private
choice. No religious tests of any kind were to be associated with that
government, for no sort of favored religion or "national" religion
would be appropriate for Congress even to consider. Laws tending to
finance religion, like laws tending to prohibit particular religions or to
favor preferred religions, were prohibited to the national government
in order to leave room for such diverse and separate policies as each
state might individually elect. The motto of the country, "E Pluribus
Unum," was significant: One nation, a civil and neutral polity, from
many states of highly diverse people and practices.
Then, with the abandonment, circa 1834, of the last state-estab-
lished religions and the subsequent enactment, in 1868, of the four-
teenth amendment, a principle originally felt suitable to apply to
Congress partly on behalf of the states ultimately became applicable to
the states as well.26 The detachment of government from religion that
25. See Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-State Sepa-
ration, 56 IND. L.J. 615 (1981) (discussing Madison's concern with the political divisiveness of
factions, reflected in his conception of the separation of church and state).
26. The Court, in Everson, regarded the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the estab-
lishment clause, 330 U.S. at 14-15, and its analysis in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984), main-
tains the consistency of that interpretation. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
215-17 (1963), the Court chastised those for whom this issue seems less clear cut than it has
seemed to the Court for engaging in practices "of value only as academic exercises." Id at 217.
For recent scholarly debate on the issue of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see R. BEROER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134-56 (1977) (stating that the fourteenth amendment was simply
designed to prevent discrimination against blacks in those rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights
Bill of 1866 and was not intended to make the Bill of Rights binding on the states); Curtis, The Bill
oRights as a Limitation on State Authority. A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 45 (1980) (arguing that legislative history shows that the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment was designed to apply the Bill of Rights to the states); Berger, Incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Ca, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435
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Jefferson and Madison had originally fought to achieve in Virginia had
become a general obligation.
II.
In their first full address to the subject, in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation,27 all nine Justices of the Supreme Court agreed in this view.
Indeed, the following summary by Justice Black was faulted by no one
on the Court:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious be-
liefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and
State." 28
Rather, four of the nine Justices, agreeing entirely with Black's view,
dissented solely on the separate basis that they, unlike the majority,
believed it had not been honored, that is, that the particular law in
question 29 was defective. Indeed, it was on the basis of Justice Black's
description of the first amendment, rather than on the basis of some
different description, that the dissent itself also relied.
30
Fourteen years later, Justice Frankfurter, who had concurred in
Everson with Justice Black's sentiments even while dissenting in the
particular case, returned to the same theme. "The Establishment
Clause," he declared,
(1981); Curtis, Further 4dventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A
Reply to Michael Curtis'Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1(1983); Curtis, Still Further Adventures of the
Nine-Lived Cat: A Rebuttal to Raoul Berger's Reply on Application of the Bill of Rights, 62 N.C.L.
REv. 517 (1984). For more dated examples, see L. PFEFFER, supra note 5, at 142-49; Van Alstyne,
supra note 5, at 866-67.
27. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
28. Id at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
29. See id at 46 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The particular law at issue in Everson was a local
law providing for bus fare reimbursement for sums spent by parochial as well as by public school
children to ride municipal buses.
30. See id at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Vol. 1984:770]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and com-
petence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's
belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and
man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress may
not make these matters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now,
may any legislature in this country. Neither the National Govern-
ment nor, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a State may, by any device, support belief or the expression of
belief for its own sake, whether from conviction of the truth of that
belief, or from conviction that by the propagation of that belief the
civil welfare of the State is served, or because a majority of its citi-
zens, holding that belief, are offended when all do not hold it.3 1
Difficult cases still arise, of course, even under the Black-Frank-
furter view of the establishment clause. Generally, however, the diffi-
culty of such cases has been limited to circumstances in which the
good-faith conduct of civic business has imposed a hard choice on indi-
viduals whose personal religion has instructed them in opposition to
the law. In such cases, there is a fair question whether the relevant
public policy is so pressing that, whatever the strength of the relig-
iously-grounded opposition to it, exceptions will not be tolerable, or
whether, to the contrary, respect for religious pluralism counsels a
measure of state self-restraint.
At one extreme, criminal prohibitions of homicide, mutilation, or
child abuse cannot yield regardless of the intensity of the religious pas-
sion that demands such exceptional forms of "free" exercise. At the
other extreme, however, the civil polity is not seriously distressed if it
excuses those for whom ritual forms of respect for the state are acts of
blasphemy. In the latter circumstance, the doubtfulness of the state's
policy, the meanness of disallowing conscientious abstention, and the
gratuitousness of the damage to the sincerely pious weigh in favor of
accommodating sincerely held religious beliefs.32 The establishment
clause as described by Jefferson or Madison and summarized in the
quoted excerpts from opinions by Justices Black and Frankfurter is not
necessarily hostile to such an accommodation. Therefore the occa-
sional wisdom of accommodation does not constitute an objection to
traditional establishment clause doctrine. To the contrary, respect for
so modest an accommodation as would be required in these circum-
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961).
32. See West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1943). For a more
recent example, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (compulsory school attendance
law not applied to Amish) and compare Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (selling
of religious literature not exempted from state prohibition of sale of literature by minors on the
streets). See also Choper, supra note 5, at 673.
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stances would be strongly counselled by the free exercise clause. 33 In
between these extreme and thus rather obvious cases, the closer and
more difficult issues must continue to be addressed. without inconsis-
tency with the principles of neutrality and separation.
In sharp contrast to those closer issues and presenting a paradig-
matic disregard of the establishment clause in virtually every dimen-
sion of its concerns would be a case involving all of the following
deliberate acts of government:
1. The overt alignment of government with the particular theology
of one, politically dominant, religious sect;
2. The collaboration of government with commercial interests to
stimulate consumer purchases by the government's own promotional
use of a particular religion's artifacts and mysteries;
3. The propagation under government sponsorship of distinctly
religious symbols uniquely associated with one sect's most holy
event-the miracle of divine birth of its particular prophet and
messiah;
4. The purchase and maintenance through tax levies, and promo-
tional display in outdoor public location each year, of sectarian ob-
jects, during the season designated for the Mass or eucharist of one
religion's principal sacrament.
The facts of Lynch v. Donnelly34 fit this paradigm exactly. Accordingly,
when appropriately petitioned by a natural coalition of plaintiffs, a fed-
eral district court enjoined the governmental practice.35 The state had
not merely aided "all" religions but rather had promoted emphatically
and exclusively one religion. It had not only broken with a general
neutrality regarding purely religious doctrine, it had also preferred one
religion over others. It had used tax money in support of a religious
activity and encouraged belief in, and endorsed, the particular holy
day-Christ's Mass-of one sect. It openly participated in the affairs of
one church by duplicating in wood and plastic the imagery of a sacred
event in order to encourage a general secular, commercial enthusiasm
to intensify its holy day. The wall of separation between church and
state had clearly been breached by a clear governmental, politicized,
symbiotic embrace of one faith's preferred holy day.
36
33. See West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (freedom of
worship "may not be infringed on... slender grounds.").
34. 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984).
35. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1181 (D.R.I. 1981), a§i'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir.
1982) (2-1 decision), ree'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The plaintiffs in Lynch included an objecting
taxpayer, offended members of minority religions, and aggrieved residents alienated by the ab-
sorption by government of a partisan religious observance that the government had adopted and
sponsored. 525 F. Supp. at 1153-57.
36. See id at 1173 (concluding that the municipality had "tried to endorse and promulgate
religious beliefs by including a nativity scene in its display").
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In its examination of this obtuse collaboration, the district court
had little problem. The entanglement with religious controversy, the
identification of the state with one favored theology, the alienation of
many of its own residents embittered by the hubris of local government
enlisting the tax power and regulatory authority to identify itself with
the creed of one religion's martyred prophet, the objectively communi-
cated support and endorsement of that religion's singular claims, al
ought to have made the case easy.
In Lynch v. Donnely,37 a divided panel in the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by the Chief Justice, with four justices dissenting, reversed
both lower court holdings that the municipal purchase, maintenance,
and periodic illuminated Christmas display of a purely Christian nativ-
ity scene was unconstitutional. The opinion perfunctorily acknowl-
edged the "three-prong" test of the Court's earlier cases, which
demands that a challenged statute have a "secular legislative purpose;"
that its "primary effect" neither "advance nor inhibit" religion; and
that it not promote "an excessive entanglement" with religion.38 Pur-
porting to apply the "primary effect" prong of this test the Chief Justice
observed:
Of course the creche is identified with one religious faith but no
more so than the examples we have set out from prior cases .... 39
We can assume, arguendo, that the display advances religion . . .;
[but] whatever [the] benefit to one faith. . .[] display of the creche is
no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Con-
gressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the holiday it-
self as "Christ's Mass" .... 40
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would re-
quire that we view it as more beneficial to and more an endorsement
of religion. . . than. . . [specific forms of assistance previously al-
lowed such as textbook loans to parochial schools and bus fare reim-
bursements, or] more of an endorsement of religion than the Sunday
Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland. . . [or the payment
of chaplain salaries sustained in Marsh v. Chambers].4t
37. 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
38. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362, (paraphrasing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971)).
39. Id at 1365 (emphasis added).
40. Id at 1364 (emphasis added).
41. Id at 1363 (emphasis added) (citing, for example, Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330
(1983); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (permitting expenditure of public funds for
textbooks for students attending church-sponsored schools); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
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We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving from in-
clusion of the creche than from these benefits and endorsements pre-
viously held not violative .... 42
Such was the tenor of the analysis under the purported "three-
prong" approach; but, given the Chief Justice's warning that the Court
would not be "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive
area" 43 we should assuredly be alert to the possibility that an altogether
new test was aborning. What is that test? Apparently it is an "any
more than" test. Here, in one possible summary, are its parts.44
First, the court must determine whether the government acts
that have been questioned plainly sponsor, assist, promote, or ad-
vance a particular religion, its specific practices, its distinctive theol-
ogy, or its establishment.
Second, assuming that the acts complained of plainly do spon-
sor, assist, promote, and advance a particular religion, its specific
practices, its distinctive theology, and its establishment, the court
must then nonetheless also determine whether in doing so, the gov-
ernment has merely acted in a manner consistent with what it has
regularly done--or with what Congress has regularly done-in the
past.
Third, unless the court finds that the additional acts are more
egregious than other acts of government of a like kind-that is, un-
less the new acts advance this religion "any more than" government
has generally advanced a preferred religion-the court shall sustain
the acts in question.45
42. Id at 1364 (emphasis added).
43. Id at 1362.
44. Actually, if one pays very close attention to the cases, it appears that in fact a majority of
the Court has been applying a "scarcely any more than" test; the question is whether what govern-
ment has done in the instant case is scarcely any more than what a majority of the Court has
acquiesced in in the recent past. Thus, from the five-to-four decision in Everson, one may trace
forward through Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241-49 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674-80 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for religious property); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-49 (1973) (upholding state revenue bonds to finance a Baptist college;
approximating the phraseology of the "any more than" test); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 745-70 (1976) (upholding public grants to private colleges and religious institutions);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-55 (1977) (providing textbooks, standardized testing and
scoring, diagnostic services and career guidance for parochial students constitutional, but provid-
ing instructional materials and equipment and field trip services unconstitutional); Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-62 (1980) (upholding use of public funds to reimburse
nonpublic schools for performing state-required testing and reporting); Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.
Ct. 3062, 3065-71 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for expenses of sending child to nonpublic
school); and Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3332-37 (1983). To be sure, even now not every
gross practice will be sustained. For example, mandatory posting of the Ten Commandments in
public schools was held invalid in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-43 (1980) and legislative
delegation to churches of an absolute veto over neighborhood liquor licenses was held invalid in
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 120-27 (1982).
45. This summary is of course my own and certainly would not be useful if recited to the
Court in any actual case. Even so, this mere parody of a test was at once applied by a lower
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In an artless sense-but in no sense that will withstand even the
mildest scrutiny-the Lynch case can also be fitted within the literal
wording of the "three-prong" test a majority of the Court has declared
that it will usually apply to establishment clause claims.46 The first
prong, we recall, is that the law or governmental practice must possess
a "secular" purpose. If "secular" is taken merely descriptively, simply
as a synonym for whatever things temporal or civil government thinks
appropriate to undertake as a temporal and civil government, then the
facts of the Lynch case do indeed fit a "secular" purpose. That purpose
is the government's own decision to identify its own conduct, and the
uses of its tax revenues, with the events, values, mysteries, customs, and
monotheism of a particular religion-the religion, hardly coinciden-
tally, that is most widely subscribed to nationally as well as locally.
The municipal purchase and annual, public, illuminated, tax-supported
Christmas display of a nativity scene fit within that purpose exceed-
ingly well. By the same gesture, the "primary effect" of the city's prac-
tice is without doubt to bring about that secular, that is, governmental,
objective. Moreover, because the local government pursues its policy
strictly through the uses of its own monies and its own property and
does not engage any church to provide the place for its illuminated
display, there are obviously no "entanglements" with any church or
religious body as such.47
federal court, in Fausto v. Diamond, No. 80-0520S (D.R.I. June 19, 1984) (available Sept. 12,
1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The case rejects a taxpayer's suit to enjoin city tax
funding and maintenance of an anti-abortion memorial, dedicated to the "unknown child," which
was located on city-owned property and was the object of an overtly reigious dedication cere-
mony. Id Although the court acknowledged the affiliating linkages with the locally dominant
religion-remarking that "two. . . commissioners declaimed, in effect, that their church required
them to vote in support of the [religiously inscribed, anti-abortion] plaques," id, and that "it is
impossible to ignore the imposing backdrop of the cathedral," id-it turned aside the complaint
on the basis that "this court is unable to discern that the memorial is a greater aid to the Roman
Catholic faith than was the creche in Lynch," id (emphasis added).
See also Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), which sustained congres-
sional appropriations of $84 million per year for military chaplain salaries and related religious
programs. The court held that in light of the Supreme Court's acceptance of a state legislature's
use of tax funds to pay its own in-house chaplains-in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335-
37 (1983)-it could see no sufficient distinction from the case before it even though the sums were
vastly greater, the chaplains many times more numerous, and the programs much more pervasive.
Katcoff, 582 F. Supp. at 474; see also supra note 44 and cases cited therein.
46. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
47. Concurring in the Court's decision in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), Justice Brennan wrote:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment
Clause have forbidden, are those involvements with secular institutions which (a) serve
the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of gov-
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Viewed this way, the decision need not have been compromised by
the majority opinion's ineffectual attempt to compare the city's illumi-
nated, commercially-manufactured, outdoor nativity scene to the mere
inclusion of historic religious paintings in a public museum.48 Neither
need the opinion have been hedged by suggesting that had the nativity
scene been unaccompanied by additional Christmas tokens such as
Santa and reindeer-additions, incidentally, that embarrass the sugges-
tion that the entire display was otherwise similar to the collection of a
public art museum-it might have been unconstitutional. 49 Rather, a
square logical fit can be made to the conventional three-prong test, al-
beit a fit that is at once self-validating and ironic. Essentially, it is the
following, as, regretfully, I believe was the real case.
Insofar as the theology, artifacts, and liturgy of a particular reli-
gion have already formally been adopted into government itself and
made a regular feature of government's own practice, the religion has
itself been partly secularized. That is, it has been assimilated into and
ermuent for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends...
Id at 294-95 (emphasis added). The last point, that government may not "use essentially reli-
gious means to serve governmental ends," meant, in the context of Schempp, that even supposing
the sole reason for Bible readings at the opening of each class day were utterly secular-that is,
not at all to induce belief in the Bible but solely as a clever device to get students to quiet down-
they were nonetheless unconstitutional because the religion clauses meant to forbid government
from exploiting religious forms as a deliberate tool of secular policy. The license of the state, to
appropriate the forms of religion as instruments of state policy, may subject each such religion to
degraded uses over which it can exercise no control. Avoidance of that hazard was a principal
theme of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance. See J. MADISON, supra note 7. In Lynch, how-
ever, the Chief Justice virtually stood the Brennan criteria upside down. First, he declared that it
is enough that there be any discernible secular purpose, no matter how minor; he explicitly de-
clares that it need not be exclusive or even dominant. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363 n.6. Then, insofar
as any secular purpose is present, he declares that even assuming essentially religious means have
been appropriated by government as the means of effectuating that secular objective, it is "irrele-
vant." Id at 1363 n.7.
But why it is "irrelevant" is not explained, nor is it clear why anyone would not think it
relevant. If the object were purely to build military morale, and the principal effect were indeed to
build such morale rather than, for example, to assist a particular church, would it be similarly
"irrelevant" that the means chosen to build such morale involved the government in producing
and distributing crosses, copies of militant hymns such as "Onward Christian Soldiers" and the
like, in preparing troops for the capture of oil fields in Iran? The majority's failure to see "rele-
vance" in such a matter is dismaying.
48. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1369.
49. Id at 1358, 1362-63. Justice Brennan's dissent sought to narrow the decision accordingly,
id at 1370, and a later district court decision limiting the damage wrought by Lynch has enjoined
a city's funding of a nativity scene where "no Santa Clauses or trees" outfitted the display, ACLU
v. City of Birmingham, No. 83-CV3348DT (E.D. Mich. July 23, 1984) (available Sept. 12, 1984,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). But see McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that Lynch was not "based upon the physical context.., of the creche" but rather upon
the context of the "holiday season"), cert. granted sub nor. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 53
U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1984) (No. 84-277).
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made a part of the state temporal, and not simply left to the church
spiritual. To whatever additional extent other incidents of that religion
are similarly annexed and identically made a part of official state prac-
tice, the acts that are necessary to do so obviously do serve a "secular"
purpose, namely, the appropriation of a particular religion or faith as a
practice of government. The events that do this may be individually
modest, discrete, and extremely gradual, as has happened in the United
States.50
This movement, a movement of gradual, secularized Christian eth-
nocentrism, has tended to elude the establishment clause itself. Origi-
nally, in merely marginal, seemingly trivial, and obviously
nonjusticiable5' ways, statesmen and politicians easily commingled re-
ligiously colored habits of personal conduct with their deportment in
public office. Some no doubt did so naturally, without thinking about
it. Others, perhaps somewhat crassly, doubtless saw strong political ad-
vantage in making great public display of their piety. The common-
place personal tendency, to identify preferred "religious truths" with
national policy, is institutionally irresistible in times of greatest sacri-
fice, such as war time. Thus, it is scarcely surprising, given the religious
antecedents of the abolitionist movement, that the Union cause in the
Civil War would be mingled with the assimilation of Christian symbol-
ism, and that Christian theology thus would itself become part of the
cause. Recall, for instance, the Battle Hymm of the Republic. That "In
God We Trust" was first authorized for use on American coins in 1864,
therefore, is scarcely remarkable. 52 That the fuller transition was made
during the 1950's, with the alteration of the national motto,5 3 the inser-
tion of a common monotheism in the Pledge of Allegiance,54 and the
mandatory insertion of "In God We Trust" on all United States cur-
rency and money,55 is equally unsurprising. Jingoistic desires to paint
a vivid contrast in the Cold War, separating ourselves, claiming "God"
within "our" government, for sanctimonious contrast with "Godless
atheistic" Communism, made the deliberate appropriation of a perva-
sive religiosity an irresistibly useful instrument of state policy.56
50. See, e.g., the Chief Justice's own presentation in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-62 (reciting
government's official acknowledgements since 1789 of religion's role in American life).
51. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) (discussing the Court's
"policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues").
52. A. SToKEs & L. PFEFFER, supra note 1, at 568.
53. H.R. REP. No. 1959, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEws 3720, 3720-21.
54. A. SToKEs & L. PFEFFER, supra note 1, at 570.
55. Id
56. Id at 570-71. See also W. MILLER, PIETY ALONG THE POTOMAC 41-46 (1964) (discussing
religion and anti-Communism during the 1950's).
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In these marginal, gradual, ordinary ways, then, virtually from the
beginning the nation has drifted, reidentified itself, and become, like so
many others, accustomed to the political appropriation of religion for
its own official uses. In exchange, it now purchases religious support.
Late arrivals to America may suppose they can take the government's
religiosity or leave it, but they are stuck with the reality that clashes so
clearly with the first amendment: Ours is basically a Christian-
pretending government where they will be made to feel ungrateful
should they complain. The gradual but increasingly pervasive install-
ment of compromised religious ritual within government itself thus
draws that which was formerly outside to the inside; the prevailing
monotheism has been made a commonplace exhibition in state prac-
tice, and put to service and supported by the state when felt useful.
Additional appropriations from sectarianism may then become logi-
cally fitted as part of this "secular" but sectarian state. Distinctly reli-
gious practices, insofar as they serve the state, thus by definition have
virtually succeeded in satisfying a secular purpose and promoting a sec-
ular interest. In this gradual absorptive fashion, then, satisfying the
Court's current "test" can scarcely ever be a problem.
III.
Not so long ago, Justice Powell said that he believed we were now
far removed from the dangers that so troubled Jefferson and
Madison.5 7 It is difficult to agree that that is so and, in any event, the
supposition seems scarcely sufficient ground for the Court to modify
the first amendment simply to accord with its own confidence. "E
Pluribus Unum" should mean something to us all, aspirationally, that
we ought not abandon although Congress itself has seen fit to do so.
The idea of a civil nation of free people, diverse in their thoughts, equal
in their citizenship, and with none to feel alien, outcast, or stranger in
relation to civil authority, remains powerful and compelling. The in-
stallation of a state theism has not been worthy of the United States.
Lynch v. Donnelly was itself not a credit to an able and distinguished
Court. Both the case and the tendency it represents are disappointing
reminders that religious ethnocentrism, as well as religious insensitiv-
ity, are still with us. I do not know whether Mr. Jefferson would have
been surprised, but I believe he would have been disappointed.
57. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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